Research case study

Political Alignment in Recommendations

Who contributes to improve a shared recommender?

  • Online experiment
  • Recommender systems
  • Collective action
Editorial diagram of two users contributing ratings to a shared recommender system

Research question

Who contributes to improve a shared recommender?

Steering a recommender towards a preferred balance requires user effort, but the resulting improvement is shared. The project asks when people contribute costly information and when they instead rely on a partner to improve the system.

Design

From private preferences to a shared system

Participants establish a private movie ranking, are matched with another participant, and repeatedly decide whether to pay to provide a rating. A rating is privately costly but can improve recommendation quality for both people. The design crosses political versus non-political disagreement with homogeneous versus heterogeneous matches.

01Preference elicitation

Participants create a private ranking that provides an accuracy benchmark.

02Matching

The platform communicates whether a partner is similar or opposed in the relevant domain.

03Costly rating

Each participant chooses whether to incur a private cost to add information.

04Shared recommendation quality

Both matched participants can benefit from contributions to the recommender.

Interface evidence

The participant journey

The images document the implemented workflow without exposing a live participant-facing study.

Interface for creating a private top-five movie ranking
A private top-five ranking establishes the accuracy benchmark.
Matching screen describing whether the paired participant is similar or opposed
The matching screen communicates the relationship between partners.
Neutral movie-rating contribution decision
A contribution decision in the non-political condition.
Political movie-rating contribution decision
A contribution decision in the political condition.

Contribution

Research design made operational

I designed and implemented the platform and contributed to study design and piloting. The system combines preference elicitation, treatment-based matching, repeated incentivised decisions, and transparent payoff logic in a reusable experimental workflow.

Preliminary signal

Pilot evidence, not a final result

The pilot produced usable variation in contribution decisions. Interpretation remains preliminary while the team refines framing, beliefs, and the separation of strategic response from instruction-induced effects.

Outputs

Materials

Joint work with Dietmar Jannach, Silvia Milano, Caterina Giannetti, Cecilia Vergari, Nicola Meccheri, and Marco Catola.